Marquette Law Review
Volume 45
Issue 2 Fall 1961

Article 7

Congressional Investigations: First Amendment
Limitations on the Power to Punish for Contempt
for Refusing to Answer Before a Congressional
Committee
James H. Yagla

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
James H. Yagla, Congressional Investigations: First Amendment Limitations on the Power to Punish for Contempt for Refusing to Answer
Before a Congressional Committee, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 294 (1961).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol45/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

because there is nothing in the evidence to support this figure.
Surely there is no greater basis in the evidence for supporting a
suggested amount to be allowed for pain over a longer time segment than the life expectancy of the plaintiff.
The only manner in which one can justify this anomaly is by
recognition of the simple fact that juries do appear to return higher,
often excessive, verdicts in cases where suggestion of a per-diem
formula is permitted than in those cases where no such suggestion
was employed.30 Viewed in this light, the distinction gains at least
practical validity, but the failure of the court to present its case
in that vein leaves doubt as to whether the distinction was intended
and if it will survive. In any event, it is now clear that a suggested
award, couched in non-inflammatory terms, is permissible. While
the Affett decision is technically a defeat for plaintiff's counsel in Wisconsin, it may have given them more leeway than they legally enjoyed in the past.
Louis W.

Constitutional Law

-

STAUDENMAIER, JR.

Congressional Investigations -

First

Amendment Limitations on the Power to Punish for Contempt for
Refusing to Answer before a Congressional Committee: The petitioner was summoned to testify before a committee of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities at a hearing in Atlanta,
Georgia. The subcommittee was investigating Communist colonization
and infiltration of industry in the South. After being sworn in and
stating his name, the petitioner refused to answer any further questions
on the ground that his rights under the First Amendment would thereby
be violated. As a result of his refusal to answer the subcommittee, he
was convicted for contempt of Congress and this conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari and upheld the conviction. The basis of the decision
was that the First Amendment claims raised by the petitioner were
identical to those advanced in the Barenblatt' decision and upon the
authority of that case could not prevail. Wilkinson v. United States,
U.S., 5 L. Edd. 2d 633 (1961).30 The National Association of Claimant's Compensation Attorneys recognizes

this distinction and has filed Amicus Curiae briefs in several recent cases, including the Affett case, involving the question of use of a formula.
1 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 (1959).
2 The specific question that Wilkinson was convicted for refusing to answer
was: "Mr. Wilkinson, are you now a member of the Communist Party?"
Wilkinson v. United States, - U.S. -, 5L. Ed. 2d 633, 639 (1961). The conviction was assaulted from several different directions before the Supreme
Court: 1) the subcommittee was without authority to interrogate him, because their purpose was to investigate opposition to the committee and to
harass and expose him, 2) the question under inquiry by the subcommittee,
which he refused to answer, was not pertinent to the investigation, 3) the
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The Committee on Un-American Activities or any sub-committee
thereof is authorized to investigate un-American propaganda for the
purpose of aiding Congress in its legislative capacity. 3 Any person who
refuses to appear or answer any question before the Committee or a
subcommittee may be punished for contempt of Congress. 4 The investigatory power of Congress, supplemented by the power to compel testimony through contempt proceedings, was the basis for the conviction
of Wilkinson.
The power of Congress to investigate as an adjunct to the legislative
function is established beyond dispute.5 Congressional capacity in this
respect has been acknowledged throughout the history of this country. 6
In McGrain v. Daugherty7 the Supreme Court recognized such power
as inherent in the Congressional body. 8 Similarly, the power to punish

for contempt is thought to reside inherently in Congress. This was established in an early case upholding contempt proceedings against a nonmember of the legislature. 9 In 1881, Kilbourn v. Thompson'° cast doubt
on the ability of Congress to examine the affairs of private citizens.'1
pertinency of the question was not made clear to the petitioner at the time
he was directed to answer it, so that he was denied due process and 4) the
action of the subcommittee in subpoenaing and questioning the petitioner
violated his rights under the First Amendment. Supra at 639. This article
will deal primarily with the First Amendment issue. The other issues, although certainly not insignificant, will be covered in connection with the
First Amendment claim.
The Wilkinson case was accompanied by a companion case, Braden v.
United States, - U. S. -, 5 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1961). The principal issues raised
in that case were substantially identical to those considered in Wilkinson.
Supra at 655.
3The committee is authorized to investigate: "(i) the extent, character, and
objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States . . . and
(iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any
necessary remedial legislation." Rule XI of the Standing Rules, 60 Stat.
823, 828 (1946).
4 Refusal of witness to testify. Every person who having been summoned
as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony
. willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer
any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than
$100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor
more than twelve months. 11 Stat. 155 (1857), 2 U. S. C. §192 (1959).
5 Congressional Investigations: A Symposium, 18 U. CHL L. REv. 421 (1951);
Legislative Inquiry Into Political Activity: First Amendment Immunity Fron
Comnnittee Interrogation, 65 YALE L. J. 1159 (1956) ; The Power of Congress to Investigate and to Compel Testimony, 70 HARv. L. REv. 671 (1957).
6 This function of the legislature has its roots in 17th century English parliamentary history. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional
Power of Investigation, 40 HARv.L. REv. 153 (1926).
7273 U. S. 135 (1927).
8 Id.at 173.
9
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204 (1821)
(This case involved attempted
bribery of a legislator); see, e.g., In Re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897);
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917); Journey v. MacCraken, 294 U. S.
125 (1935).
10 103 U. S. 168 (1881).
11 Id. at 190. Justice Miller, speaking for the court stated: "...
we are sure
that no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either
House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House
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But any doubt that Congress can compel a private citizen to appear before a committee was dispelled by McGrain v. Daugherty.12 Both the
Kilbourn and McGrain cases limited inquiry to areas which involve a
function of the legislature.' 3 In Kilbourn, the purpose of the inquiry
was found to be improper and one from which no valid legislation could
result."4 Later cases have given the legislature the benefit of a presumption that their purpose is legitimate. 15 The power of Congress to investigate and punish for contempt was thus clearly established within
the first three decades of the twentieth century. The limitation placed
on the investigatory power by the McGrain case,16 taken in conjunction
with the presumption of a valid legislative purpose, left Congress free
to investigate practically any area without judicial hinderance.17
In the post-war years, litigation concerning the investigatory power
of Congress has centered around the protection afforded witnesses by
the Bill of Rights. Chief Justice Warren has stated that witnesses,
".. . cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure."' 18 The
well-known right to invoke the Fifth Amendment protection against
self-incrimination has been firmly established as available to witnesses
before investigating committees.' 9 Wilkinson and related cases bring
into play yet another area of the Bill of Rights. The problem raised is
this: Granted that Congress has the power to investigate and punish
for contempt, what restrictions, if any, does the First Amendment place
on this power? The answer to this problem is complex and a great deal
of controversy has arisen respecting application of the First Amendment to Congressional investigations.
has jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither of these
bodies possesses the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs
of the citizen."
12 Supra note 7, at 173, 174.
"Supra note 10, at 190 and supra note 7, at 175, 176.
'4 Supra note 10, at 193. The case involved inquiry into a real estate pool. The
court felt that the legislature had delved into matters that should be the
concern of the judiciary.
15 In Re Chapman, supra note 9, at 670 (resolutions do not have to declare
in advance what the Senate meditated doing when the investigation was concluded); McGrain v. Dougherty, supra, note 7, at 178 (presumed to be in
good faith to aid in legislating) ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263,
295 (1929). (This case went a step further and declared that the right to
investigate in aid of the legislature's constitutional power is not abridged
because the information sought may be used in the prosecution of pending
government suits.)
16Supra note 7. That the purpose must be of a legitimate legislative nature.
17 Apart from investigating a subject within the competence of Congress, the
question asked and refused must also be pertinent to the subject under inquiry before punishment can be inflicted. Supra note 4.
18 Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 188 (1957). This was dicta in the
case which involved procedural deficiencies of the investigation and the First
Amendment issue.
19 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Emspack v. United States, 349
U. S. 190 (1955) ; Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155 (1955).
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The First Amendment issue initially emerged in United States v.
Josephson.20 Josephson refused to be sworn or answer questions before
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. His position was that
an inquiry into his political activities would violate his rights under the
First Amendment. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld a contempt conviction. The court found that the First Amendment rights of Josephson were overridden by a compelling governmental interest in national security.21 The issue was again raised in

United States v. Barsky.2 2 There a majority held that First Amendment
rights were overruled by public interest, but specifically recognized the
possibility of infringement of these rights. 3
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both these cases,24 leaving
the lower courts in doubt as to how to deal with First Amendment
claims. This doubt was intensified by the Court's subsequent avoidance
of the First Amendment issue 2 5 United States v. Rumely20 illustrates
the reluctance of the Court to face the issue raised by witnesses claiming
protection of the First Amendment:
Grave constitutional questions are matters properly to be decided
by this Court but only when they inescapably come before us for
adjudication. Until then it is our duty to abstain from marking
the boundaries of congressional power or
delimiting the protec27
tion guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The lower courts, faced with the reluctance of the Supreme Court,
found a great variety of reasons for failing to convict witnesses claiming
the protection of the First Amendment 28
20 165 F. 2d 82, (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied 333 U. S.838 (1948).
21 The court declared that when speech, ". . . clearly presents an immediate
danger to national security, the protection of the First Amendment ceases."
Id. at 91.
22 167 F. 2d 241, (D. C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 843 (1948).
23 Ibid.
24 Supra notes 20 and 22.
25 Marshall v. United States, 176 F. 2d 473 (D. C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339

U. S.933 (1950) ; Lawson v. United States, 176 F. 2d 49 (D. C. Cir. 1949),

cert. denied, 339 U. S. 162 (1950); Dennis v. United States, 339 U. S. 162
(1950), cert. denied on this issue; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41
(1953) (questions not within scope of authorizing resolution); Emspak v.
United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (5th Amendment grounds).
26 345 U. S. 41 (1953).
27 Supra note 25, at 48. The court avoided the First Amendment issue by merely

finding the questions put to the witness were not within the scope of the
committee's authorizing resolution.
28 United States v. Raley, 96 F. Supp. 495 (D. D. C. 1951) (self-incrimination);
United States v. Nelson, 103 F. Supp. 215 (D. D. C. 1952) (same) ; Keeney
v. United States, 218 F. 2d 843 (D. C. Cir. 1954) (erroneous admission of
evidence); United States v. Rumely, 354 U. S. 41 (1953) (scope of resolution) ; Bart v. United States, 349 U. S. 155 (1955) (failure of committee
to rule on witness's objections) ; United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791
(D. Mass. 1956) (pertinency); United States v. Grossman, 229 F. 2d 775
(D. C. Cir. 1956) (self-incrimination).
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In 1957, the Supreme Court finally encountered the issue in Watkins
v. United States29 and a companion case. 30 Neither case was decided on
the basis of the First Amendment claims. 31 However, the Court did
spend some time on the protection afforded by the First Amendment.
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the court in Watkins, made it clear
that the First Amendment applies to Congressional investigations. 32
He further warned that First Amendment rights could be abridged
indirectly by social ostracism. 33 Clearly, the court recognized the danger
of investigating committees running afoul of the First Amendment.
For dealing with this problem the court propounded a balancing of interests test. In the words of Chief Justice Warren:
The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be
ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures
from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however,
that every congressional investigation is justified
by a public
34
need that overbalances any private rights affected.
In Barenblatt v. United States, 3 5 the Supreme Court critically modi-

fied the grounds for the Watkins decision. 36 Justice Harlan, speaking for
the majority, then proceeded to the central issue of the case involving
the First Amendment contention. The "balancing of interests" test appearing in earlier cases was firmly established as determinative of First
Amendment rights:
29354 U.S. 178 (1957).
30 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957).

31In Watkins, the court held that the authorizing resolution of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities so vague that the petitioner could not
judge whether the questions were pertinent to the inquiry. Thus, his conviction was invalid under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Supra note 29, at 215. In Sweezy, it was found that there was no indication
that state legislature wanted the information sought from the petitioner.
Thus, on basically the same grounds as in Watkins, the court held there was
a violation of the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment. Supra note
30, at 254, 255.
32 Supra note 29, at 197. In regard to the motive for investigation, Chief Justice
Warren stated, ".

.

. We have no doubt that there is no Congressional power

to expose for the sake of exposure." Supra note 29, at 200. But, subsequently
the court has declared that they will not inquire into the motives of Congressional committees. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 1, at 133.
33 ,. ..And when those forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox,
unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of
the witness may be disastrous. . . . Beyond that, there is the more subtle and
immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere to the most orthodox
and uncontroversial views and associations in order to avoid a similar fate
at some future time." Supra note 29, at 197, 198.
34 Supra note 29, at 198.
35 Supra note 1; See, Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72 (1959).
36 That the authorizing resolution was too vague and in this connection Watkins
was not sufficiently appraised of the pertinency of the questions put to him
by the examiners. Supra, note 29, at 215. The Barenblatt decision dismisses
the vagueness of the resolution recognized in Watkins as satisfied by the
"persuasive gloss of legislative history." Supra note 1, at 118. Further, the
purpose of the inquiry had been publicly announced and the petitioner refused to answer concerning his own Communist affiliations. This was held
to be clearly pertinent to the inquiry. Supra note 1, at 124, 125.
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Undeniably, the First Amendment in some circumstances protects
an individual from being compelled to disclose his associational
relationships. However, the protections of the First Amendment,
do not afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all cir...
cumstances. Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar
governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and
public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.
(emphasis ours) .3
On the governmental side was the need to investigate the threat of internal subversion by Communist activity. The power to investigate
this sphere of activity, ".

.

. rests on the right of self-preservation, 'the

ultimate value of any society.' Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494."35 The Court did not clearly delineate the rights of the individual
sacrificed by the balancing test.3 9 Discussion of the issue ended abruptly
with a flat denial of the petitioner's claim:
We conclude that the balance between the individual and the governmental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of the
the provisions of the First Amendment
latter, and that therefore
40
have not been offended.
Wilkinson raises substantially the same issues as covered in Baren41
blatt. The Court abides point for point with the Barenblatt decision.
But, the petitioner sought to differentiate Barenblatt on the basis that
42
he was attempting to influence public opinion to abolish the committee.
The Court rejects this argument:
But we cannot say that, simply because the petitioner at the moment may have been engaged in lawful conduct, his Communist
activities in connection therewith could not be investigated....
As the Barenblatt opinion makes clear, it is the nature of the
Communist activity involved, whether the momentary conduct is
that establishes the Governlegitimate or illegitimate politically,
43
ment's over-balancing interest.

The Watkins and Barenblatt decisions read together left room for
speculation as to how the Court would treat First Amendment claims.
3V
Supra note 1, at 126.
8

3 Supra note 1, at 128. The court went on to say,

"....An

investigation of ad-

vocacy of or preparation for overthrow certainly embraces the right to identify

a witness as a member of the Communist party.... The strict requirements
of a prosecution under the Smith Act ... are not the measure of permissible
scope of a congressional investigation into 'overthrow' . . ." Supra note 1,

at 130.

39 Supra note 1, at 134. The court simply says that the record is barren of
other factors that might indicate the rights of the individual had been violated
and enumerates several procedural defects as examples of these rights.
40 Supra note 1, at 134.
41 To a great extent the issues raised in Wilkinson were similar to those raised
in Barenblatt.See the text of footnote 2.
42 Supra note 2, at 643.
43
Supra note 2, at 643.
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The opinion in Watkins seemed to indicate that the Court was on the
verge of protecting witnesses from congressional committees on the
basis of the First Amendment. Barenblatt, however, emphatically re44
fuses to do this, especially where Communist activity is involved.
Wilkinson established the premise that: whether the activity examined
is legitimate or non-legitimate is not the point, the crucial fact is whether
there are any Communist overtones connected with this activity. 45 Then

the interest of the government will override the right of the witness to
refrain from disclosing his political associations.
The rationale behind First Amendment claims is not apparent from
an examination of the majority opinions in the foregoing cases. From
the moment this issue was first raised, there have been strong dissents
46
finding violation of First Amendment rights.
The supposition that investigating committees have violated the First
Amendment rights of witnesses has developed primarily on two lines:
(1) compelled disclosures can and often do constitute prior restraints
on the freedom of political association and though 7 and (2) constitutional values such as the rights conferred by the First Amendment cannot be balanced in this situation."'
That this type of compelled disclosure by committees may be an
indirect restraint on political activity is apparent. Many, not just the
timid, will avoid controversial political ideas precisely to avoid subsequent danger of investigation. Aside from this fact, Justice Black dissenting in Barenblattasserts:
To apply the Court's balancing test under such circumstances is
to read the First Amendment to say 'Congress shall pass no law
abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition, unless
Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that
on balance the interests of the Government in stifling these freedoms is greater than the interest of the people in having them
exercised.' 49
44

Supra note 1, at 127-32.

45 Supra note 43.
46 Judge Clark dissenting in the Josephson case. Supra note 20. Judge Edgerton

dissenting in the Barsky case. Supra note 22.

47 Justice Douglas in Rumely, stated that if a committee can force a publisher

to disclose his mailing list, ".
further, ".

.

. the free press as we know it disappears" and

. the imponderable pressures of the orthodox lay hold." Supra

note 25, at 57. Note the dissent of Justice Black in Barenblatt, supra note 1,
at 131 and the dissent of Justice Black in Wilkinson, ".

.

. For I believe that

true Americanism is to be protected, not by committees that persecute unorthodox minorities, but by strict adherence to basic principles of freedom
that are responsible for this Nation's greatness." Supra note 2, at 648.
48The dissent of Justice Black in Barenblatt, supra note 1, at 143. Meiklejohn,
The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF.
L. REv. 4 (1961); Kalvan, Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt
Opinion, 27 U. CHi. L. REv. 315 (1960); Meiklejohn, The Barenblatt Opinion,
27 U. CI.L. REv. 329 (1960).
49 Supra note 1, at 143.
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Professor Alexander Meiklejohn discussing constitutional values and
their proper application states:
But the Barenblatt opinion, with one smashing blow, proceeds at
this point to amend the Constitution. In place of the limited
Congressional authority 'to provide for the common Defense' it
establishes 'the (sovereign) right of self-preservation' and gives
to it an 'ultimate status' as contrasted with the other values which
Congress is commissioned to serve.50
From an examination of the opinions involving utilization of the
First Amendment as a defense, it is apparent that the Court will carefully scrutinize cases in which the issue is raised. Whether the First
Amendment limits the power of investigating committees, aside from
cases involving procedural or authorization defects, is far from settled.
Wilkinson was a five-four decision, as was Barenblatt. The Court in
the future could swing to the position that a witness has been deprived
of his rights under the First Amendment.
The appeal in the position of the minority in Wilkinson and comparable cases is the concentration on the protection of a traditional freedom. The minority feels that we are sacrificing the rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment for national security. The majority of the
Court reminds us that it is dealing with Communism.
In viewing the controversy between the majority and minority, it
seems apparent that the "communist conspiracy" is the greatest threat
that has ever faced our country. Nothing has ever come as close to
undermining the basic structure of our society. To deal competently
with this problem, the legislature must enact legislation. Investigation
of the situation is necessary before adequate legislation can be enacted.
Serious interference by the Court in this area could greatly impair the
ability of the legislature to deal adequately with the spread of Communism. Faced with the reality of the "cold" war, the position of the
majority is sound. The answer to the minority position is that the rights
granted by the First Amendment are not absolute. Political freedom
undoubtedly includes the right to criticize and seek reform, but it does
not include the right to destroy the society that has nourished it. Thus,
the justification for the majority position that First Amendment rights
must at times yield in the interest of self-preservation.
Apart from the positions of the majority and minority on the Supreme Court, there is a third possibility. Congress can effectuate reform. Perhaps, the bitter disagreement over the methods of investigating committees could be alleviated by a reformation of these methods.
It has been suggested that a code of conduct be imposed on committees
5o0Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Freedom, supra
note 48, at 11, 12.
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to safeguard the rights of witnesses.51 Another possibility is found in
the method used by the Royal Commissions in England. This method
would employ such help as impartial experts and use a greater selectivity
in the calling of witnesses.5 2
JAMES H. YAGLA
Federal Income Taxation-Lease or Conditional Sale: Plaintiff, in its taxable year 1953, inaugurated a tool lease program and
by the end of 1954 had entered into agreements with respect to
eighty-seven machines that it manufactures. Under this program
the lessee had a choice of three plans, A, B or C. Plan A called for
a mandatory rental period of three years at 25% of the list price
per year, B for two years at 30% and 25% respectively, and C for
one year at 35%. If the lessee so desired, it could purchase under
plan A at the end of the third year for 45% of the list price, under plan
B at the end of the second for 60%, and under plan C at the end
of the first for 80%. There were also provisions whereby a lessee could
return the property or exercise the option to purchase at times
subsequent to the mandatory rental period. All three plans ran for
a maximum of seven years and carried a minimum option to purchase at 25% of the list price at the end of that time. In its 1954
tax return plaintiff treated the revenue derived from such agreements as rental income and deducted depreciation on the leased
machines. Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service audited plaintiff's books and declared the leases to be conditional sales for federal income tax purposes. After paying the additional taxes plaintiff sued for refund. Held: The lease-option agreements were what
they purported to be, and petitioner was thereby allowed to treat
the proceeds as rental income and deduct depreciation. Kearney &
Trecker Corporation v. Commissioner, 195 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis.
1961).
The lease-option agreement has both tax and non-tax advantages.' The principal non-tax benefits are a freeing of the working
capital of the lessee and an added selling feature in the sales pro5' Galloway, CongressionalInvestigations: ProposedReforms, 18 U. CHI. L. REv.

478, 483 (1951). The article also suggests several other alternatives: 1) delegation of certain types of inquiries to various outside agencies; 2) a ban on
the creation of special investigating committees of Congress; or 3) voluntary
adoption of codes of fair conduct by congressional committees. Supra at 483.
See also, Chase, Improving Congressional Investigations: A No-Progress
Report, 30 TEMP. L. Q. 126 (1957).
52 Finer, Congressional Investigations: The British System, 18 U. CHI. L. REv.
521, 554 (1951). This article has a complete analysis of the British system of
investigation. For a comparison of the Australian system of investigation see,
Campbell, Parliamentary Investigations: The Australian Experience, 9 J.
Pu. L. 382 (1960).
' For detailed discussion of lease-option agreements see: Schneider, Tax Considerations in Planning Leases, 1960 TULANE TAX INST. 455; Kirby, Con-

siderations in Business Lease Arrangements, 34 TAXES 34 (1956) ; Griesinger,
Pros and Cons of Leasing Equipment, 33 HARV. Bus. REv. 75 (1955).

